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I.

INTRODUCTION

A growing number of legal scholars have recently revived the
American legal realist thesis that legal theory does not dictate the
result in any particular case because legal theory itself is indetermi-

nate.1 A more radical group has added that theory can never constrain judicial practice. 2 So far, however, most of these assertions,
*
*

© Copyright 1988 Anthony D'Amato.
Anthony D'Amato is a Professor of Law at Northwestern University.

1. See Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997
(1985); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976). For a critical review of the indeterminacy thesis, see Solum, On the Indeterminacy
Crisis: CritiquingCritical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987). See also A. HUTCHINSON,
DWELLING ON THE THRESHOLD (1988); Balkin, Deconstruction Practiceand Legal Theory,
96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987).
2. W. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1974); S. FISH, Is THERE A
TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980); C.
NORRIS, DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1982); Fish, Don't Know Much About

the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and Literature, 97 YALE L.J. 777 (1988); Fish, Dennis
Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987); Fish, Still Wrong After All These
Years, 6 LAW & PHIL. 401 (1987); Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984); Fish,
Wrong Again, 62 TEX. L. REV. 299 (1983); Fish, Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision, 60

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:513

although forceful, have been unsystematic. 3 In this Essay, I will present a spectrum of types of legal theories in order to demonstrate, with
concrete examples, that the position of the more radical group of writers is correct-that legal theory is inherently incapable of identifying
which party should win any given case. I will try to show that no
matter how broadly or narrowly legal theories are conceived, no matter whether they are aggregated or otherwise combined with other
theories, and no matter whether legal theories are claimed to resolve
specific disputes or just to influence broad legal trends, legal theory is
incapable of constraining judicial practice.

II.

THE SINGLE ALL-ENCOMPASSING THEORY

Let us take as a first example the tip of the inverted pyramid of
economic analysis that Judge Richard Posner has urged us to adopt as
the theoretical basis for all decisionmaking: that wealth should be

maximized.' My argument is that in any imaginable case, acceptance
by the court of the wealth maximization principle cannot point to a
decision for either side. I concede that if any case can be found where

the wealth maximization principle compels the result for one side and
not the other, then the entire thesis-that theory does not constrain

results-would be invalidated.
Because I know of no case where the wealth maximization prin-

ciple compelled a particular result, I must imagine a "strong" case to
indicate how the theory can be deconstructed. Consider a testator
who has ordered his executor to burn an original C6zanne painting in
his estate.5 If the heirs ask for an injunction against the executor,
TEX. L. REV. 495 (1982); Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and
Literature,60 TEX. L. REV. 551 (1982); Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN.
L. REV. 473, 538 (1984).
3. For critiques of deconstructionism, see, e.g., A. AARNIO, THE RATIONAL AS
REASONABLE: A TREATISE ON LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 158 (1987) (If there is more than one
"right answer," we are close to arbitrariness.); Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1986); Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1208 (1985);
Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS Land, 36 STAN. L. REV. 413 (1983).
Some scholars have attempted to portray Fish's deconstructionism as the equivalent of a

nihilist theory. See Fuller, Playing Without a Full Deck: Scientific Realism and the Cognitive
Limits of Legal Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 549, 562-63 (1988); Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?,
100 HARV. L. REV. 332, 345 n.46 (1986). To me such attempts are the equivalent of
postulating a non-apple and then theorizing how it would taste.
4. For his most recent statement of the matter, with citations to the earlier writings, see
Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 85
(1985).
5. Or similarly, Max Brod's decision not to burn his friend Franz Kafka's books,
contrary to Kafka's dying request. See W. BISHIN & C. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND
ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL METHOD 1-9 (1972). The problem with
using a literary example, instead of a recognized painting, is that the latter has obvious worth,
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what result? Most people probably would grant the heirs' motion for
an order enjoining the executor from carrying out the testator's wish.
Our intuition that such an injunction should issue may be
presented as an application of wealth maximization theory as follows:
(1) the utility that the testator derived in contemplation of depriving
the world of the experience of enjoying the Cezanne is outweighed by
the aggregate utilities of the rest of the world and future generations
in enjoying the painting; (2) even if we can not engage in interpersonal
comparisons of utility, by any measure the utility of the testator's
pleasure is overwhelmed by the aggregate utility of all other persons
in the present and future generations; (3) any doubt on this score is
erased by noting that the testator's utility is sunk-he has already
experienced it-and hence serving present and future generational
utility deprives the testator of nothing; (4) the cheapest means of cost
avoidance consists of not destroying the painting-the alternative
involves the cost of time, labor, matches, lighter fluid, and ash disposal. Of course, an effective presentation of the preceding four points
would involve a display of appropriate charts, graphs, diagrams,
mathematical paraphernalia, and mandatory references to Coase,6
Calabresi,7 and Posner.8 Assuming that I do so, the conclusion is
nigh inescapable-that issuing the injunction maximizes wealth.
With all that cumbersome apparatus marshalled to prove the
obvious, is the reader forced to conclude that wealth maximization
compelled the result that I reached? Not if an equally complicated
wealth maximization argument is given that reaches the opposite
result. Once again we would begin with an array of appropriate
graphs, formulae, and references, this time to critics of Coase, Calabresi, and Posner, and then argue as follows: (1) destroying the painting would increase the value of all the other Cezannes in existence,
which in the aggregate may add more wealth to the world than would
have been taken away; (2) issuing the injunction would diminish the
scope of private property rights and hence devalue, to a limited but in
the aggregate an enormous extent, all the property in the world, such
aggregate devaluation more than exceeding the value of the destroyed
C6zanne; (3) issuing the injunction would mean that paintings as a
whereas the former is not well-recognized. Think of how many draft novels are destroyedprobably several hundred for each novel that is published-and out of all the published novels,
very few have any value. Moreover, failure to publish all these bad novels maximizes wealth
from the point of view of the forest and forest-lovers.
6. See, e.g., Coase, The Problems of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
7. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1970).
8. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986).
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whole would fetch lower prices due to the fact that their owners
would then realize that they will not be acquiring absolute testamentary rights over the paintings, and that this lowering of prices would
exceed the value of the lost Cezanne; (4) the ensuing lower prices paid
for paintings would encourage fewer persons to become artists and
hence eventually lead to a significant loss in the world's output of art,
thus diminishing the artistic wealth of the world more than the value
of the diminution that would accompany the destruction of the
C6zanne. Q.E.D.
In short, at least in the strongest case that I can imagine for
applying the wealth maximization principle, that very principle can be
employed to justify the opposite result. But I did not reach this result
by any claim that the law itself contains opposing principles-a claim
early made by some legal realists and more recently adopted by some
critical legal studies scholars. Note that the "principles" I invoked
were invented by me for the occasion. Nor have I claimed that in
opposition to the "wealth maximization" principle there is a competing principle of "wealth minimization." Rather, I assert that neither
a theory nor its opposite is capable of constraining the result in any
given case. However, maybe I should not be allowed to invent my
own case and then deconstruct it. I therefore tried a different selection method and asked my colleagues on the Northwestern faculty
who are working in the law and economics area9 to cite a case where
the result seemed to be dictated by the wealth maximization principle.
Only one case was suggested (although I was pointed to many law
review articles)-the classic case of Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. ° In looking at that famous case, I concede that the majority's opinion in Vincent seems consistent with the principle of wealth
maximization-but, I contend, the dissent is equally consistent with
that same principle.
In Vincent, the plaintiff dock-owner sued for $500 worth of damages to his dock that were caused by the defendant's steamship, which
was lawfully moored to the plaintiff's dock, being buffeted against the
dock by an unanticipated, violent storm." Although conceding that
it would have been imprudent for the defendant to have attempted to
cast his steamship off from the dock, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
12
affirmed the verdict for the dock-owner.
9.
10.
Grady.
11.
12.

Professors Ian Ayres, John Donahue, Victor Goldberg, and Mark Grady.
109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910). The suggestion came from Professor Mark
109 Minn. at 457-58, 124 N.W. at 221.
109 Minn. at 460, 124 N.W. at 222.
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The critical fact that apparently resulted in thecourt's decision
for the plaintiff was the court's perception that the defendant "deliberately" held the steamship to the dock. 3 The court found, as a factual matter, that the "lines were kept fast, and as soon as one parted
or chafed it was replaced, sometimes with a larger one." 14 The court
therefore concluded that "having . . . preserved the ship at the

expense of the dock, it seems to us that her owners are responsible to
the dock owners to the extent of the injury inflicted." 15
In what sense does this decision maximize wealth? Wealth
would appear to be maximized if one compares the result in the case
to a hypothetical alternative that no one argued-that the vessel was
obliged to cast off in the middle of the storm, with possible total loss
of the vessel. Compared to that hypothetical alternative, wealth was
maximized by allowing the vessel to remain in the dock and charging
the owner of the vessel for the $500 worth of damage to the dock. But
such a hypothetical case was not the real alternative before the court.
No one argued that it was a serious alternative possibility, because no
matter what the costs in damage to the dock, no vessel-owner would
risk losing the entire vessel if the worst damage to the dock would be
less than the risk to the vessel of casting off. No one in Vincent
argued that the owner should have cast off; indeed, the court found
the ship-owner's decision to remain fastened to the dock to be prudent
even though it assessed him the maximum penalty-liability for the
16
damage to the dock.
The only reasonable alternative to the court's actual decision was
the one contended by the defendant-that the owner of the dock
should absorb the $500 loss. 7 As to that alternative, the dissenting
opinion provided a theory that is at least as convincing as the
majority's:
In my judgment, if the boat was lawfully in position at the time the
storm broke, and the master could not, in the exercise of due care,
have left that position without subjecting his vessel to the hazards
of the storm, then the damage to the dock, caused by the pounding
of the boat, was the result of an inevitable accident. If the master
was in the exercise of due care, he was not at fault. The reasoning
of the opinion admits that if the ropes, or cables, first attached to
the dock had not parted, or if, in the first instance, the master had
13. 109 Minn. at 459, 124 N.W. at 222.

14.
15.
16.
17.

109
109
109
109

Minn.
Minn.
Minn.
Minn.

at 457, 124 N.W. at 221.
at 459, 124 N.W. at 222.
at 458, 124 N.W. at 221.
at 458-59, 124 N.W. at 221.
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used the stronger cables, there would be no liability."8
Clearly the dissent's view is just as wealth-maximizing as the majority's. Economic theory does not concern itself with whose wealth is
maximized. Rather, after Coase, it is only concerned with maximizing aggregate wealth. 9 Thus the only fact "noticed" by economic
analysis is the value of saving the vessel. But this value is conceded by
both sides. It follows, then, that wealth is maximized irrespective of
which party is charged for the damage to the dock.
For those whose economic theories favor "policy" arguments, we
may also speculate as to the future wealth-producing effects of holding the dock-owner liable for the damage to the dock. Future dockowners will have to take into account the possibility that if a boat is
lawfully moored to the dock and a storm comes up, the dock-owner
will have to absorb any damages that result from the boat crashing
against the dock. Hence dock-owners will have to raise their rents
to discount for the possibility of such losses. Raising rents may
encourage them to mitigate future damages. For example, the dockowners might construct docks that are not easily damaged in a storm,
and they might provide extra ropes and cables so that vessels can be
securely moored, minimizing the chances that vessels will crash
against the dock. Thus dock-owners may indeed be in a better position to mitigate damages-and hence maximize future wealth-than
owners of vessels.
At this point the reader might well object that I may have
trumped my own argument-that wealth maximization does not
point to a victory for either side- by indicating that the dissent has
the better position in the Vincent case. But a little theory-speculation
can touch up the situation and either tip the balance back to the
majority side or install-if it is desired-equilibrium. For instance, a
court can speculate that vessel-owners are in a better (cheaper) position to choose the docks at which they want to moor than dock-owners are to choose which vessels may moor at their docks. Hence
wealth can be maximized by putting the loss-reducing incentive to
select the most suitable dock-the dock least likely to be damaged in
the event a storm comes up-on the vessel-owner. Thus different vessel-owners will self-allocate their ships to the docks best equipped for
mooring their ships to in the event of a storm, reducing the need for
all docks to engage in improvement construction so as to be able to
service a large range of vessels. Even so, some dock-owners will be
motivated to improve their docks so as to attract a wider range of
18. 109 Minn. at 461, 124 N.W. at 222.
19. See Coase, supra note 6, at 15-16.
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risk-averse vessels, and also to advertise their improved facilities to
the shipping community. Economists noticing these activities post
hoc may construct theories that tip the legal balance back to the way
the majority had it in the Vincent case.
In the Vincent case, as well as in my hypothetical Cezanne case,
wealth-maximization can be used to justify-I'd prefer to say, as does
Stanley Fish, "present" 2 -a decision in favor of either side. For this
reason alone (leaving aside issues of vagueness and ambiguity), the
theory of wealth-maximization does not constrain the judicial
decision.2 1
III.

A LARGE THEORY WITH ACCOMPANYING
SUBSIDIARY THEORIES

Obviously, for many observers, maximizing wealth is a hypothesis that contains so many degrees of freedom that applying it to any
set of facts will be highly problematic.2 2 Perhaps if subsidiary theories
can be added to it, the goal of constraining a particular result might
finally be reached. Consider one such subsidiary theory: maximizing
wealth entails the desirability of minimizing transaction costs. 23 Have
we now fashioned a theory that can ever indicate to a court which side
must prevail?
The term "transaction costs" depends on how we define a transaction. If we define the term narrowly as a kind of waste, we might
say that money paid to lawyers, for example, is a transaction cost. In
that case, awarding the decision to the side whose position in general
would entail paying less money to attorneys might then be indicated.
20. See Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1790 (1987).
21. I am not taking the Critical Legal Studies position that there is a fundamental contradiction in the wealth maximization principle itself, and therefore that our applications of it
will be inconsistent. It seems to me that the CLS critique of theorizing-that it embodies
fundamental substantive contradictions -elevates the idea of theory to implausible heights
(even as some CLS scholars deconstruct established theory). Marxist dialectic materialism, of
course, is the classic attempt (using non-Aristotelian logic) to set up reifications of theory that
embody contradictory norms (thesis and antithesis). Cf M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 142 (1987) ("The CLS claim, quite simply, is that there is absolutely no
politically neutral, coherent way to talk about whether a decision is potentially Pareto efficient,
wealth maximizing, or whether its benefits outweigh its costs.").
22. Judge Posner, however, has contended that the very simplicity of an economic theory
is a sign of its strength, because the simpler the theory, the more hypotheses it is likely to yield.
Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 281-87 (1979).
This may be an implied, though inadvertent, admission that the real utility of such theories is
that they yield numerous publication opportunities for legal scholars.
23. See R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 45, 436; Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53
TEX. L. REV. 757, 777-78 (1975); Stigler, The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to
the Scholars, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (1972); Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics: The
Governance of ContractualRelations, 11 J. L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
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But we can always view "transaction" more broadly. Having lawyers
in the deal might result in their spotting other problems that can be
avoided, whereas if lawyers are not involved-the transaction cost for
lawyers is zero-the parties may wind up spending a great deal more
money in litigating unclear contractual terms than they would have
spent had lawyers been involved in the first place. Hence it is not a
wasteful transaction cost so much as a prudent way to do business.
No matter what the case, one side can plausibly argue that transaction
costs be defined narrowly and the other side that it be defined broadly.
Sometimes transaction costs are invoked to justify awarding a
factory an entitlement to pollute on the theory that giving the entitlement to the public could necessitate enormous transaction costs for
the factory if it wanted to purchase pollution rights (the holdout problem). 4 Yet the contrapositive is also true: the public could suffer
enormous transaction costs in attempting to purchase the entitlement
from the factory (the free-rider problem).2" Thus the transaction cost
factor gives us no guide as to which party should be awarded the
entitlement. In general, Coase's theorem-which says that (in the
absence of transaction costs) the social result comes out the same no
matter which party gets the entitlement 2 6- by its own terms fails to
give judges a guide as to whom the entitlement should be awarded,
while at the same time not defining transaction costs (and thus we
return to the previous problem of broad versus narrow definition).
Nor can the avoidance of transaction costs be transmuted into a "policy" argument, because ultimately a transaction cost is such only in
the eyes of the beholder. What looks like a transaction cost to the
parties looks like the entire point of the transaction to the attorneysa house in the country, golf course privileges, and a college education
for the children. Who can say that the parties are worse off in a
regime in which there are readily available attorneys, even if some of
the cost of that ready availability is to pay the lawyers "transaction
costs"?2 7
24. Cf Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability. One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). For a nontechnical discussion, see
generally A. D'AMATO, How TO UNDERSTAND THE LAW (1989).
25. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 24, at 1095 & n.13.
26. Coase, supra note 6, at 15.
27. See D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1, 44 (1983) (What is waste to one
person (e.g., a client who pays attorneys' fees or brokerage costs) might be a livelihood to
another (attorneys, brokers).). In a letter published in the Wall Street JournalI claimed: "The
number of lawyers in a country is almost directly proportional to the amount of personal
freedom each individual enjoys in that country. The more lawyers there are, the more are
available to champion a client's cause against the government, the bureaucracy, the police, the
secret police." D'Amato, Letter to the Editor, Wall Street Journal, June 19, 1986, at 31, col. 1
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IV.

A COMBINATION OF THEORIES

If one theory about law doesn't constrain results, whether or not
accompanied by subsidiary theories, can several theories taken together do the job? Think of a theory as a large gray translucent circle;
a second theory overlaps the first circle; a third overlaps the first two,
and so on. Perhaps with enough overlapping a given area is defined
more sharply; pretty soon the area becomes black. Do theories work
together in this fashion to define any given area with greater and
greater precision?
It follows from the Skolem-Lowenheim proofs of the early 1920s
that no amount of multiplication of indeterminate theories can yield
determinate results.28 Consider as an example from the law the three
theories of the first amendment listed in Professors Brest's and Levinson's constitutional law casebook: protecting representative government, advancing knowledge and promoting truth, and protecting
individual autonomy. 29 Do these three theories, taken together, yield
black-letter results in any possible concrete case? For instance, does
the combination of all three theories result in a rule giving (or denying) pickets a right to block the sidewalk? To glare menacingly at
people who cross the picket line? To raise their fists at people who
cross the line? Or consider "commercial speech"- does our knowledge of all three theories point to a rule that protects (or exempts)
commercial speech under the first amendment? How about pornography? (If pornography appears to be a function of "individual autonomy," an advocate for suppression could argue that it degrades the
people who are used as models for the pornography and hence
reduces their individual autonomy, or even tends to destroy the
viewer's ability to be an autonomous person by elevating her passions
above reason,). As to any of these questions, enlightenment is not
furthered if you use one, two, or even all three of the Brest-Levinson
(commenting on a series of articles entitled The Litigation Explosion, Wall Street Journal, May
16, 20, 23, 29, and June 3, 1986).
28. Leopold Lowenheim and Thoralf Skolem published a series of papers in the early
1920s and generally proved that, for any set of axioms that one chooses for characterizing any
branch of mathematics, an infinite number of other interpretations are available that are
drastically different and yet satisfy the chosen axioms as well. See M. KLEIN, MATHEMATICS:
THE Loss OF CERTAINTY 271-74 (1980). What is true of mathematical formulae is a fortiori
true of words. See R. SMULLYAN, FOREVER UNDECIDED (1987). Anything that we are
given-whether it is a set of axioms, a description of facts in a legal dispute, a collection of
statutes, a shelf full of precedents-can be interpreted in an infinite number of radically
different ways in which each interpretation fits all the data exactly. See S. KORNER, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS 154 (1960).
29. P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING:

CASES AND MATERIALS 1092-96 (2d ed. 1983).
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theories -even though the game of theorizing may itself be furthered
by piling on more theories.
Of course, a free-speech case may seem so obviously to fall within
the first amendment that piling on the Brest-Levinson theories only
serves to confirm the obvious. Yet if we take as given a "no prior
restraint" theory that many feel is the bedrock of first amendment
protection, and add to it the three Brest-Levinson theories, there are
nevertheless whole categories of cases that challenge the applicability,
either way, of the entire pile of theories: a judge ordering jurors not
to talk about the case when they go home at night; 30 "gag rules" generally; 3' the "fairness doctrine";32 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which places a prior restraint upon the filing of frivolous papers in court; national security secrets; and treason and espionage. Whenever the judiciary and society as a whole seem ready to
tolerate and prefer an exception to a theory such as "prior restraint,"
they call it an "exception" and retain the theory. If the day comes
when most people realize that there have been so many exceptions
that talking about the rule has become worthless, then "no prior
restraint" will be downgraded from a theory to one of many "policies." Or, if it really becomes unpopular-as the "separate but equal"
theory of the fourteenth amendment 33 had become unpopular by
1954 3 4-then a judge might "overrule" the theory entirely. 35 Such
cases do not mean that the theory was in force until the moment the
judge decided to overturn it, nor that the theory had already outlived
its usefulness and that the contrary theory was waiting to be articulated in an appropriate opinion. Rather, all those cases mean is that
the theory (of prior restraint or of separate but equal) became increas30. See, e.g., United States v. McGrane, 746 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v.

Lemus, 542 F.2d 222 (4th Cir. 1976); Winnebrenner v. United States, 147 F.2d 322 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 863 (1945).

31. See, e.g., Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, 463 U.S. 1303 (Brennan, Circuit Justice
1983) (affirming in part and denying in part application for stay of gag order in homicide trial);
Levine v. United States District Court for the Central District of California, 764 F.2d 590 (9th
Cir. 1985) (restraining order on attorneys' comments permissible remedy to avoid pretrial
publicity, but overbroad as worded).
32. See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters of
California, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications
Commission, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969).
33. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (public transportation).
34. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (law school); McLaurin v. Oklahoma Board
of Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (graduate school); Sipuel v. Oklahoma Board of Regents, 332
U.S. 631 (1948) (law school); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (graduate
school).
35. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("We conclude that
in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal.").
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ingly out of fashion as a mode of presenting -judgments, and hence
new theoretical rationalizations were needed for those persons in the
legal community who have a psychological need for theoretical rationalizations. When the rationalizations become too strained to the
ears of those who like them, and when the exceptions become too
numerous in the eyes of those who enjoy rules, the time finally comes
for an overruling opinion. By 1954, "separate but equal" in education
was already moribund;3 6 and I've argued elsewhere that the psychological aftermath of the overruling decision in Brown v. Board of Education37 might have been far more favorable to the goal of integrating
schools if the Court had avoided overruling the separate but equal
theory.38
Stanley Fish might say that the question is never whether a particular theory applies, since it always applies! As he put it:
"[T]heories always work and they will always produce exactly the
results they predict, results that will be immediately compelling to
those for whom the theory's assumptions and enabling principles are
self-evident. Indeed, the trick would be to find a theory that didn't
work."' 39 The reason theories work is that we expect them to work.
But the subtlety here is that we can at best expect them to "work" as
theories; it is irrational for us to expect them to work in the sense of
constraining practice (for all of the reasons that I am suggesting in
this Essay).
Even if the Brest-Levinson theories individually or in combination cannot constrain any given case, may we not at least say that in a
casebook they perform the useful function of organizing the case
materials for students? And if our answer is in the affirmative, then
must we not conclude that "theory" has at least this teaching effect
upon the law-minimal though that effect may be?
I have elsewhere questioned whether the organization of
casebooks into subject-matter categories might itself be inimical to the
36. See supra note 34.
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. S.L. WASBY, A. D'AMATO & R. METRAILER, DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO
ALEXANDER: AN EXPLORATION OF SUPREME COURT STRATEGIES 92-130 (1977).
39. S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE

COMMUNITIES 68 (1980). Minsky would agree that whatever theories our cerebral cortexes
come up with, those are the theories that require us to explain satisfactorily to ourselves what
is happening and what we are experiencing. See M. MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF MIND (1986).
This view, incidentally, would contradict the older theory-laden view of Leon Festinger, who
argued that people are impelled to resolve conflicting mental theories. L. FESTINGER, A
THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 263-66 (1957). The better view, I think, is that if
someone's theories appear to be conflicting, we may simply have failed to articulate accurately
what those theories are. Further investigation might discover an accommodation-theory that
the person really uses instead of the dissonance-theories that we thought the person was using.
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goal of training good lawyers." It is part of the seductiveness of "theory" that, when we use it as a organizing principle, the cases collected
thereunder seem to be well-organized. But this apparent organization
is an illusion; the same cases would appear to be poorly organized if
we used a different theory, and hence the apparent coherence of the

organization is a function of the (arbitrary) theory that was chosen as
the organizational principle. (The theory only seems non-arbitrary
because we are accustomed to it-from previous casebooks.)
Perhaps one of the most important examples of the use of theory
in organizing law-study materials is the division of first-year courses
into "contracts," "torts," and other subjects. Yet Grant Gilmore,
among others, has persuasively shown that some "contract" cases

have more affinity to "torts" cases than they do to other "contract"
cases." If he is right,4 2 then he has in effect suggested an organization
superior to the one that divides part of a curriculum into "contracts"
and "torts. '4 3 My point is simply that large organizing theories such
as "contracts" and "torts" have no constraining effect upon the way
judicial decisions are or should be reached, and hence their use in law
schools can best be explained in terms of habit, convenience, and
"teaching slots."
V.

AGGREGATE EFFECTS OF THEORIES

Is it possible to assert that large theories affect large numbers of
cases even if they do not constrain particular cases?' (This would be
akin to a quantum-theory argument: that any individual quantum
40. D'Amato, The Decline and Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student Consumerism,
37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 461, 485-87 (1987).
41. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). This is true even if Gilmore's
account as a whole is or is not "exaggerated." See J. DAWSON, GIFrS AND PROMISES 3

(1980). See also R. Posner, supra note 8, at 231 ("almost any contract problem can be solved
as a tort problem").
42. A more recent, and even more persuasive, demonstration than Professor Gilmore's is
Professor J.M. Balkin's deconstruction of the element of "will" in contract promises that
builds upon the work of Jacques Derrida and P.S. Atiyah. See Balkin, Deconstructive Practice
and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 767-72 (1987).
43. A radically different first-year curriculum might someday in the future consist of
Common Law, Equity, Legislation, Justice, Forms of Action, Interests, Entitlements, etc., as I
suggested in an earlier article. See D'Amato, supra note 40, at 492 n.58.
44. See, e.g., B. D'ESPAGNAT, IN SEARCH OF REALITY 25-50 (1983); W. HEISENBERG,
THE PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE QUANTUM THEORY 10-12, 55-65 (1930). The reason that
it works in quantum mechanics is that the "laws" of quantum mechanics are mathematical
formulae that correspond to the empirical evidence, but which make no sense to us as observers. There are formulas for the "wave" and the "particle" aspects of electrons, and these
formulas predict the location of an electron (Born's "probability wave"), but no human being
has ever explained what the electron can possibly be, or what it can look like, or what it can
behave like. All that quantum mechanics has been able rigorously to show is that certain
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interaction is totally indeterminate, but that statistically a large
number of interactions can be predicted to considerable precision by
the laws of quantum mechanics.) My colleague Mark Grady has
objected: "Surely you don't mean to assert that the vast changes in
antitrust law over the past twenty years that have led to drastic reduction in verdicts for antitrust plaintiffs has not been the result of the
theories produced and promoted by the Chicago school of economic
analysis of law?" I replied that that is precisely the proposition I
defend. What really happened is that over the last two or three
decades the American public has largely lost the anti-big business fervor that animated the era of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. We have
seen a precipitous decline in the power of the national labor union
movement. We have seen an increase of fear that we may not be able
to compete with Japan and Korea and the Common Market. These
are real, historic changes in perception to which politicians have
responded by calling for larger and more efficient business aggregations. Conveniently and coincidentally for the Chicago school, their
writings on economic analysis of law were published contemporaneously with these societal changes of perception. When courts looked
for ways to justify judgments that departed from antitrust precedents,
they invoked the new theories handily supplied by the Chicago
school. And the Chicago school, for its part, was not bashful about
claiming credit for the shift in judicial decisions. But that does not
mean that there was any substantive causal connection between the
writings of the Chicago school and the trend of judicial decisionmaking. We can well imagine that if the courts had not changed their
attitude toward plaintiffs' antitrust actions, the Chicago school would
today look like an idle academic curiosity-as indeed it looked several
decades ago. If the political pendulum had swung in favor of
increased antitrust enforcement, other economists would have rushed
in to fill the need for modernist justifications for aggressive antitrust
prosecutions, and today we might have a reigning "Berkeley school"
or a "Minnesota school." But that didn't happen, and instead the
change in public perceptions brought into visibility the "Chicago
school."
I would even venture to predict that the pendulum will swing
back. In the 1990's, politicians and the public will increasingly realize
that bigness does not equal efficiency, and that American industry
might well be able to compete more effectively abroad if it is characterized by small, efficient firms having tight managerial control. If
experiments, when repeated, yield the same results. Those results can be characterized bybut not explained by-certain formulas.
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this new perception sinks in, I venture to say that antitrust law will
enjoy a comeback. And if it does, it will be accompanied by a new
school of economic rationalization that gets its academic visibility by
"trashing" the Chicago school. Theories do not change the real
world, and the real world does not change theories. The only interaction between theory and reality is that, when one is engaged in theorizing, one achieves credibility and presentability by invoking the
theories that at the moment of invocation seem to explain the real
world.4 5 The most popular theory is invariably the one that seems to
have the highest explanatory power; it certainly gives more writers
employment explaining it to each other and to the public.
Let us briefly consider the aggregate effects of a noneconomic
theory. Suppose that all the federal district and appellate court judges
who were appointed by the incumbent President regard themselves as
"strict constructionists." Suppose another group of district and
appellate court judges who are appointed by the successor President
regard themselves as "noninterpretivists." Over time we observe that
the first group, the "strict constructionists," are very "tough" on
"law-and-order" cases; that is, they convict and uphold the convictions of, say, 99% of all criminal defendants. We also observe that,
over time, the second group of judges, the "noninterpretivists," convict and uphold the convictions of only 90% of all criminal defendants. We might conclude that "strict constructionists" are tougher on
crime than "noninterpretivists." Indeed, the media will have come to
that conclusion even before any evidence is in. And the incumbent
President's party will campaign for the next election on a law and
order platform by promising to appoint only "strict constructionist"
judges.
But our question is whether there is any actual link between
"strict constructionism" and being tough on crime. We can answer
that question by a simple thought experiment. Suppose there is
another group of federal judges, group G, who get together and
decide that it is unrealistic to suppose that 99% of all criminal defendants were, either substantively or procedurally, fairly indicted. Suppose the G group feels that 90% is the better general result. The
45. For a good dose of common sense about theory-rationalizations in economics, see M.
BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS, OR How ECONOMISTS EXPLAIN (1980). The
theory that we choose will be the one that seems to explain the real world. This doesn't mean
that the theory really explains the real world. Rather, it only means that our choice of theory is
based on our current belief that the only good theories are the theories that explain the real
world. We would not deliberately choose an "unreal"- sounding theory over a realistic one.
Personally, I prefer the Italian saying (roughly translated): It doesn't have to be true if it's well
contrived (ben' trovato).
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group then discusses whether it should use the '"strict constructionist"
or the "noninterpretivist" theory to justify its intended result. They
decide that, at the present time, judicial decisions wrapped in "strict
constructionist" labels will be better insulated against eventual reversal by the Supreme Court and better accepted by both the politicians
and the general public. Yet some judges are afraid that strict constructionist theory is "tough" on crime and won't work for group G.
One of the judges says:
No problem. If we want to achieve the 90% general result, strict
constructionism is actually the better theory! If we adhere to the
exact letter of the Constitution and the statute, we will vastly
increase our chances of finding police irregularities, because sooner
or later the letter of the law will be violated in the process of discovering and apprehending the defendant. Moreover, we will
increase our chances of reversing convictions on substantive
grounds for roughly the same reason-people's actions rarely fit
exact textual language, and so what might look like a criminal act
if we interpret the text loosely might fall outside the text if we
interpret the text strictly.
The other judges applaud and unanimously decide to be strict constructionists; they have found a way to have their cake and eat it too.
"Strict constructionism" may be a theory, but as such it works
on the level of propaganda and rhetoric. It produces no specific
results in a single case or in a huge number of cases. The public opposition to Judge Bork was said to be a reaction against his overly strict
constructionism; this is nothing but the overwrought imagination of
legal pundits. My own reading of Judge Bork's cases demonstrated to
me that his strict constructionist arguments were practically boilerplate; he came out any way he wanted to, and simply added the usual
justificatory strict constructionist arguments.4 6
VI.

PROCESS THEORIES

Broader still would be a theory of law that suggests no substan-

tive content but purports to show how judges are (to a greater or
lesser extent) constrained in the decisional process. Ronald Dworkin

has provided such a process theory, arguing that judges, over time,
operate like serial writers in a chain novel:
Suppose that a group of novelists is engaged for a particular project
46. For an analysis of one such case, see D'Amato, Judge Bork's Concept of the Law of
Nations is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1985), reprintedwith minor changes in A.
D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 204-19 (1987). My opposition
to the Bork appointment had nothing to do with his theories but a lot to do with his
judgments.
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and that they draw lots to determine the order of play. The lowest
number writes the opening chapter of a novel, which he or she then
sends to the next number who adds a chapter, with the understanding that he is adding a chapter to that novel rather than beginning
a new one, and then sends the two chapters to the next number,
and so on. Now every novelist but the first has the dual responsibilities of interpreting and creating, because each must read all that
has gone before in order to establish, in the interpretivist sense,
what the novel so far created is. He or she must decide what the
characters are "really" like ....
Some novels have in fact been
written in this way (including the soft-core pornographic novel
Naked Came the Stranger), though for a debunking purpose ....
But in my imaginary exercise the novelists are expected to take
their responsibilities seriously and to recognize the duty to create,
so far as they can, a single, unified novel .... Perhaps this is an
impossible assignment ....
I am interested only in the fact that
the assignment makes sense ....
Deciding hard cases at law is
rather like this strange literary exercise. 47
Stanley Fish counters that the chain-novel idea does not work as a
constraint upon judges:
When a later novelist decides to "send the novel further in one
direction rather than in another," that decision must follow upon a
decision as to what direction has already been taken; and that decision will be an interpretive one in the sense that it will not be determined by the independent and perspicuous shape of the words, but
will be the means by which the words are given a shape.4 8
It is rather surprising that with both Dworkin and Fish speculating
about how such a chain novel would come out, coupled with their
many citations of the works of Agatha Christie, 49 neither of them
have cited Agatha Christie's own contribution to a serious chain
novel, The Floating Admiral.5" No better light can be thrown on the
Dworkin-Fish controversy over the chain novel than to quote por47. Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527, 542 (1982).
48. Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 551, 553-54 (1982).
49. Fish wrote, in reply to Dworkin, "Let me begin by returning to the case of Agatha
Christie, whose books, whatever they may have been, are now a fair way to becoming
contested texts in contemporary interpretive theory." Fish, Wrong Again, 62 TEX. L. REV.
299-300 (1983) (responding to Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn
Michaels): Please Don't Talk about Objectivity Anymore, in THE POLITICS OF
INTERPRETATION 287 (W. Mitchell ed. 1983).
50. A. CHRISTIE, THE FLOATING ADMIRAL (1932). The other well-known contributing
novelists were G.K. Chesterton, Canon Victor L. Whitechurch, G.D.H. and M. Cole, Henry
Wade, John Rhode, Milward Kennedy, Dorothy L. Sayers, Ronald A. Knox, Freeman Wills
Crofts, Edgar Jepson, Clemence Dane, and Anthony Berkeley.
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tions of Dorothy L. Sayers' introduction to that book. She explained
the operative rules as follows:
Each writer must construct his installment with a definite solution
in view-that is, he must not introduce new complications merely
"to make it more difficult.".... [T]o make sure that he was playing fair in this respect, each writer was bound to deliver, together
with the manuscript of his own chapter, his own proposed solution
of the mystery. These solutions are printed at the end of the book
for the benefit of the curious reader.
Secondly, each writer was bound to deal faithfully with all the
difficulties left for his consideration by his predecessors. If Elma's
attitude towards love and marriage appeared to fluctuate strangely,
or if the boat was put into the boat-house wrong end first, those
facts must form part of his solution. He must not dismiss them as
caprice or accident, or present an explanation inconsistent with
them. 5 '
Dworkin himself could hardly ask for a more constrained set of rules
for the writers in the chain, nor for a better set of controls, than to ask
each writer to submit a solution that would also be printed when the
whole novel was completed. If Dworkin were right, a fairly coherent
detective mystery story would be the result. Instead, the result
accords with Fish's speculation. In Miss Sayers' words:
Naturally, as the clues became in process of time more numerous,
the suggested solutions grew more complicated and precise, while
the general outlines of the plot gradually hardened and fixed themselves. But it is entertaining and instructive to note the surprising
number of different interpretations which may be devised to
account for the simplest actions. Where one writer may have laid
down a clue, thinking that it could point only in one obvious direction, succeeding writers have managed to make it point in a direction exactly opposite. . . . [W]e detective-writers may have
succeeded in wholesomely surprising and confounding ourselves
and one another. We are only too much accustomed to let the
great detective say airily: "Cannot you see, my dear Watson, that
these facts admit of only one interpretation?" After our experience
in the matter of The Floating Admiral, our great detectives may
have to learn to express themselves more guardedly. 52
Indeed, the book bears out Miss Sayers' candid assessment. I would
have preferred Agatha Christie's chapter (chapter 4) leading to her
proposed solution, but right away the next novelist, using everything
Miss Christie wrote, took the story in an entirely different direction.
The novel as a whole is not worth reading as a detective story; it zigs
51. Id. at 3.
52. Id. at 3-4.
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and zags from chapter to chapter to the point of utter distraction. Yet
each author's proposed solution demonstrates his or her fidelity to the
rules and to achieving a good product. The novel is eminently worth
reading if one is interested in chain-gang theories of judicial
decisionmaking.
If Miss Sayers and her fellow writers learned a lesson about
detective stories, we should learn the quite counterintuitive lesson that
an elaborate text no more constrains the next text than would a brief
text or even a few words. Does an elaborate, well-reasoned Supreme
Court case on, say, aid to sectarian schools, tell us how the next
Supreme Court case on the subject is likely to come out? Professor
Choper doesn't think so; he writes that "subsequent decisions have
produced a conceptual disaster area."'5 3 It is true that the next case in
the line may bear a theoretical resemblance to the prior case; the theory-talk will be largely cited and repeated, giving as much of an
appearance of continuity as any two successive chapters in The Floating Admiral. But the decision in the next case is no more constrained
by the previous judge's opinion than the solution envisaged by an
author in the book is constrained by the previous chapter.54
VII.

FORMULAIC THEORIES

All the exemplary theories that I have used so far may be criticized on the grounds of overbreadth and vagueness. Let us next consider a representative theory that seems quite specific if not
mathematical. The "negligence formula" suggested by Judge Learned
Hand states that the defendant is negligent "if the loss caused by the
accident multiplied by the probability of the accident's occurring
53. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to ParochialSchools-An Update, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 5, 6 (1987). In part, the reason may be that Professor Choper's expectations were too
high; he regarded the Lemon case (as did the Supreme Court) as having handed down a threepart "test." See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). But it was no "test" at all; rather,
it was simply theory-talk of the most ambiguous sort. Consider just the second of the three
"tests"-that the challenged program must have a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion. Id. at 612 (citing Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)). If
you're a religious fanatic-optimist, everything on earth has the primary effect of advancing
religion. If you're an atheist, nothing can possibly do that. If you're anywhere in between, you
can come out anywhere you want by "applying" this "test."
54. I am not claiming that precedent has no force. The real question is "what is
precedent?" For me, it is the array and selection of facts in the previous case. Precedent,
therefore, has force to the extent that those facts are similar to the ones in the present case. I
have attempted to develop this theory by constructing a multiple regression analysis that can
be programmed with the reported facts of all the judicial precedents within a jurisdiction; the
result is a statistical determination of the degree of "fit" between the precedential facts and the
facts of the case at hand. See A. D'AMATO, JURISPRUDENCE: A DESCRIPTIVE AND
NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW 169-77 (1984).
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exceeds the burden of the precautions that the defendant might have
taken to avert it. ' " To show that this formula does not constrain any
judicial result in any imaginable case is harder than my previous
examples of wealth maximization or freedom of speech, but the effort
is worth taking because theories that seem specific, like Hand's, seem
to carry considerable weight in the legal literature these days. In fact,
it is the application of specific theories like Hand's that convinces
many lawyers, judges, and scholars that they are really doing legal
thinking.
My demonstration begins with as hard a case that I can think of
for the other side. A driver of a car in a city consults his map of the
city while driving and, in the process, fails to see where he is going,
runs his car up on the sidewalk, and hits a pedestrian. On these facts,
anyone might say that applying the Hand formula constrains the judicial result that the defendant was negligent: the driver's burden of
precaution was extremely slight and the consequence extremely damaging. To answer this, I will not resort to fabricating additional facts
that might show that this is a very rare and justifiable exception to our
feeling that the defendant was negligent; rather, I will confine myself
to the hypothesized facts. My argument is that instead of Hand's
formula constraining the result in the case, the result in the case produces Hand's formula.
I contend that the result in the case is a direct function of the
interpretive community in which we live, and would be different in a
different interpretive community. For instance, replace the driver of
the car with a driver of a chariot in ancient Rome. If the driver was
reading something while driving and the chariot went off the street
and hit a pedestrian, there was no liability under Roman law. This
result is often summed up by saying that there was no tort of negligence in Roman law. 6
Now I contend that applying Hand's formula to the Roman case
would not have led to a different result. The very first phrase of the
formula "loss caused by the accident" would have been interpreted
55. R. POSNER,

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW

122 (2d ed. 1977) (paraphrasing the test of

United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.)); see R.
POSNER, supra note 8, at 148 & n.2; Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29
(1972).
56. See, e.g., M. KASER, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW § 36, at 152-54 (R. Dannebring trans.
1965). Under Roman law, negligence (culpa) was linked to.positive acting. Id. at 153. See also
W. GORDON & 0. ROBINSON, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS 391 (trans. 1988) ("[N]o liability is
imposed on someone who inflicts loss without either fault or malicious intent, but by some
accident."); L. MIRAVITE, HANDBOOK FOR ROMAN LAW 356 (1970) (For an act to be
wrongful, it must (1)be voluntary (done with intent to.injure or with culpable negligence), (2)
not be in exercise of a legal right, and (3) cause a loss.).
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under Roman law as a loss of zero. This interpretation could proceed
on either or both of two grounds. First, "accidents" do not "cause"
losses in the legal sense in the Roman context of no-negligence; accidents are like acts of god-they just happened and had no legal consequences. Hence, whatever loss the pedestrian suffered was neither
legally caused by nor the legal result of the accident. Second, the
pedestrian had no legally cognizable or measurable "loss" at all. If
the pedestrian had gotten sick, he would have had no legally cognizable loss; similarly, he has no legal basis to complain against the chariot driver for his injuries."
We see that there is a fundamental circularity in the Hand
formula (just as there is, I venture to suggest, in every legal formula
that has ever been articulated). All the numbers that have to be
plugged into Hand's formula- costs and probabilities- can only be
computed given the existence of a legal system that is consistent with
the formula.5" The numbers thus are functions of the negligence system. If a state does not have a negligence system-as in Roman
times-then the numbers will be zero. If the state has a primitive
negligence system, the numbers will be lower than the numbers that
would be assigned in the United States today. Perhaps the driver's
slight cost in not consulting the road map when he drives would outweigh the slighter legal assessment of costs inflicted upon the injured
pedestrian. In the nineteenth century, Hand's formula would probably have had lower costs for the victim's damages and higher costs for
the defendant's burden of precautions. The fact that Hand's formula
has numbers in it should not impress us; in fact, its boundless variability is a direct function of the legal system that it unsuccessfully seeks
to constrain.
Even if we are dealing only with the legal system currently in
place, the Hand formula begs the question. This is because the costs
57. We might explain this by observing that, under Roman law, pedestrian life was cheap.
Indeed, more consideration was given to the convenience of chariot drivers than to victims.
H.G. Wells speculated that in the distant future, if longevity is greatly increased, we may
revive the Roman system as a way of disposing of surplus pedestrian population. See H.G.
WELLS, THE TIME MACHINE (1895).

58. The legal system therefore can never be an alternative to an accident or risk-prevention
scheme because it must be part of the context within which we define accidents and risks.
Professor Huber has condemned judges, lawyers, and legal scholars for focusing on "public
risk" and ignoring the increasing amount of "private risk" that results from legal disincentives
to produce new aggregate, risk-reducing technology. See Huber, Safety and the Second Best:
The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 278 (1985).
Professor Huber may or may not be right, but the only way to find out would be to set up a
controlled empirical experiment. No amount of law review analysis, however, can possibly
separate what is to count as "risk" or "accident" (or, pace, "acceptable" risk) from the legal
system that defines those terms and assigns monetary values to them.
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of accident avoidance and damage to the plaintiff are a function of the
awards given in negligence lawsuits, including the very lawsuit that is
taking place when the Hand formula is applied.
Apart from the circularity paradox, there is the larger self-confirming hypothesis that the Hand formula, which purports to be a test
for negligence, only works once negligence has been determined. For
example, a child darts out into the street from between two parked
cars and is hit by a passing motorist. Assuming that there are two
lanes in the driver's direction-that the driver could have chosen to
drive in the left lane, but instead drove in the right lane-then if the
driver had driven in the left lane, the darting child would have
become visible to the driver in time for the driver to have avoided
hitting the child. Yet due to the general traffic rule that requires driving in the right lane except when passing or preparing for a left turn,5 9
the driver chose to drive in the right lane. Applying Hand's formula,
the cost to the driver of driving in the left lane would be trivial,
whereas the cost to the victim was overwhelming. Hand's formula
would then require that the driver be held legally liable to the child.
But the courts will not apply Hand's formula in this case, because
they would not find the driver negligent in the first place. How could
a court of law disregard the dictates of a traffic statute? (But the darting child disregarded the statute and paid dearly for it.) No
"formula" for negligence will apply to this or to any other case unless
it is felt that the driver should be liable; but if and when society gets
around to feeling that the driver should be liable, then what the driver
did in this hypothetical case will be called "negligence" and the Hand
formula will be trotted in to "prove" it.' °
A brief mention should be made of "factors" as components of a
formulaic theory. Take, for example, their use in deciding whether
corporate debt instruments should qualify as debt or equity for tax
purposes. Courts and commentators have proposed a large number of
factors 6 '-a count of thirty-eight specific factors has been said to be
inadequate 62-and yet outcomes seem to become more unpredictable
59. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.081 (1988); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, § 11-701 (1988);

MINN. STAT. § 169.18 (1988).
60. If one. rejoins here that what is really being applied to all these cases is a theory called
"negligence theory," my reply is that this theory "applies" only in those cases in which we
want to find the defendant liable and not in all the other cases. It is true that there will be a
shifting standard over time. Someday, perhaps, all drivers will be held liable for all accidents
to darting children, and then that liability will be said by commentators to be an application of
some legal theory, such as "strict liability" or "negligence."
61. Holzman, The Interest Dividend Guidelines, 47 TAXES 4 (1969).
62. See Slappey Drive Indus. Park v. United States, 561 F.2d 572, 582 n.16 (5th Cir.
1977); Tyler v. Tomlinson, 414 F.2d 844, 847 (5th Cir. 1969).
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and indeterminate as more factors are prescribed and taken into
account.63 Moreover, the ejusdem generis problem becomes increasingly acute as new factors are added: do we imply additional factors
that seem to be needed to fit the case at hand on the theory that the
listed factors were meant to be representative of others like them, or
do we rule out any additional factor on the ground that the list of
identified factors creates an expectation of being exclusive and exhaustive? In general, any theory that spawns subsidiary theories or factors
creates only the illusion of certainty, because at best the "sons of theory" cannot add up to anything more determinate than the parent
theory, while at worst the parent theory is degraded by the additions.
VIII.

THE MINIMAL FORMULAIC COMPONENT AS THEORY

Every formula has basic terms that appear "factual" rather than
"theoretical." In any economic formula, the terms "utility," "utile,"
"cost," "optimality," and the like, seem to be non-problematic measurable factual components of economic theory. Let me focus upon
the term "cost." 6 ' In tort law, the idea of "cost" seems to be a factual
component of formulas such as "cheapest cost avoider" and "the cost
of precaution." We tend to look at the term "cost" as if it can routinely and non-problematically be filled in with a dollar amount. A
"cost" is found lurking in nearly every theory and every formula
relating to the economic analysis of law.
What 'exactly is a "cost"? First, let us consider this problem in
the context of a situation that could lead to litigation. Hospitals incur
a very slight cost in "tagging" patients about to be led into surgery;
the tag is usually a tight plastic bracelet on the patient's wrist. Before
hospitals undertook the practice of tagging patients, there were a few
cases of patients in busy hospitals being wheeled into the wrong operating room where the wrong organ was removed from their bodies. It
is easy to say that the precaution costs of tagging are far lower than
the horrendous costs of the accident; it is the least problematic example of a disparity in "costs" that I can think of. Yet these "costs" are
only costs in light of the legal context in which they occur. In a totalitarian state, where doctors as well as the state hospitals in which they
work are immune from liability, the slight cost of tagging the patient
might seem higher than the zero cost-to them - of accidents. Tag63. See Gibson, The Intractable Debt/Equity Problem: A New Structure for Analyzing
Shareholder Advances, 81 Nw. L. REV. 452, 464-65 (1987). I made the same point earlier
with respect to the law becoming increasingly dense and fine-meshed. See D'Amato, Legal
Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1983).
64. I have benefited from conversations about costs that I had with Professor David Gray
Carlson when I visited Cardozo Law School as a Visiting Professor in the fall semester of 1986.
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ging might never be introduced in such hospitals, a handy justificatory "theory" being that patients are lucky to get a chance of recovery
in a hospital and therefore anything that might go wrong is the
patients' assumed risk. Tagging, or any other accident-prevention
device, would be introduced into such systems only by virtue of the
sense of professionalism or responsibility-if any- of the doctors and
administrators in the hospital. Whether or not they do so, the underlying fact is that the legal system recognizes no tort liability, and
hence the "cost," as far as the legal system is concerned, remains
65
zero.

Indeed, any use of "costs" in any legal context begs the question,
because the legal question is the specification of that cost-and yet we
can't specify the cost until we know the legal result. We have reached
the same result as in the previous section's analysis of the Hand
formula.
But perhaps there are "costs" that can be ascertained wholly
outside the legal system, so that problems of question-begging do not
arise. Here is one possibility: George Stigler is said to have
remarked, "if you've never missed a plane, you've been spending too
much time in airports." Clearly the "cost" here is one that is not
normally thought of as occurring in a legal context.66 Yet I suspect
that Stigler's notion of cost "rings true" primarily to audiences such
as those who would read or write an Essay such as this one. For us,
wasted time in airports is clearly a cost that we try to minimize even
at the expense of an occasional missed flight. Thus we think there is
something objective about the "cost" of wasting time in airports. But
for many other people, missing a flight is a panicky situation to be
avoided at all costs. Getting to an airport comfortably ahead of time
is, for these people, a trivial cost in comparison to their apprehension
of missing a flight. They would say, "if you've ever once in your life
missed a plane, you've been spending too little time in airports."
Moreover, there are some people for whom waiting in airports is
exciting-they like the hustle and bustle of modern airports. They
look forward to their trip, in part, because of the excitement of getting
on and off planes. Their version of the Stigler aphorism would be: "if
you ever get a chance to fly, be sure to allow enough time for enjoying
the airport." Far from being a cost, to them the delay is a reward. A
"cost" is thus the way we interpret something that we do or some65. A simpler example is that the present legal system does not take into account the
"cost" to a cow or a pig of being slaughtered as a food animal.
66. Theory cannot limit the domain of law. It is possible to imagine a context in which a
group of passengers might sue an airline for leaving on time when the airline knew that there
was a tremendous traffic jam on the roads leading to the airport.
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thing that happens to us; different people interpret it in different
ways. 67 A cost is not a factual component of a theory; rather, it is a
mini-theory in itself. Like any theory, it does not determine our evaluation of any situation. We cannot know whether Dorothy is objectively spending "too much time" in airports by simply knowing
whether or not she has ever missed a plane; rather, we have to know
68
whether Dorothy believes she has spent "too much time" in airports.
A cost is, at bottom, not objective at all. It follows, then, that despite
elaborate appearances of objectivity, any economic formula or theory
that uses that term cannot be objective. I suggest that every component of economic formulae can be deconstructed in a manner similar
to the argument here about costs.69

IX. THE DREARY THEORY
The dreary-theory is the most effective rhetorical use of theory.
It is an example of one-upmanship. 70 The proponent simply clothes
her arguments in whatever appears to be the most formidable, forbidding, scientific, and neutral theory-talk that is available and fashionable on the current scene. The less the audience understands it, the
more they will be impressed by its power, neutrality, and
persuasiveness.
When used by judges it lends an aura of legitimacy to their rulings. The psychology was best explained by H.C. Anderson in his
important paper "The Emperor's New Clothes."' 7' Serious people
never want to admit that they lack the intelligence to comprehend
what others are talking about. The ideal theory trades on this simple
67. A traditional example is labor. To many people, work is a job that they would prefer
to avoid. To some (maybe to many), work is a fulfilling aspect of life. Consider how many
teachers hate to retire.
68. If any large amount of money turned on the question (as it might in a lawsuit), we
would have to know whether we can credit Dorothy with telling the truth when she tells us
that she has spent too much time in airports. But how can we ever know whether someone is
telling the truth? We ask the jury, and they decide whether the amount of time Dorothy spent
in airports would, if they were Dorothy, seem excessive.
69. Interestingly economists acknowledge the impossibility of interpersonal comparison of
utilities, but then they proceed with their analyses as if this impossibility has no relevance to
everything they do. It does, however, have across-the-board relevance. There is no such thing
as a "cost"; a cost is inherently an interpersonal comparison of utilities. There is nothing
objective about a "risk"; there are risk-preferrers who seek out risk even where there is nothing
to gain (e.g., Russian roulette players). Similarly, what counts as a "reward" is in the eyes of
the beholder (some like medals and trophies, while others prefer cash).
70. See S.POTTER, ONE-UPMANSHIP (1952). The classic Italian comedy on the theme is
Machiavelli's Mandragola.
71. Anderson, The Emperor's New Clothes, I U. COPE. L.J. 1 (1868). See also P. BROOK,
EMPTY SPACE (1978) (Opera as "deadly theater" is commercially successful because opera
goers cannot admit that they are bored.).
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fact of human psychology. The theory, however, must obey certain
parameters; it cannot be pure gobbledygook. The weavers who
presented the Emperor with new clothes exclaimed as they "dressed"
him how magnificently he wore the extraordinary raiments, one attribute of which was their invisibility. If for a moment the couturiers
winked at each other and the Emperor caught the wink, the jig would
have been up. Instead, their repeated exclamations about the beauty
of the new clothes were repeated by the courtiers in the immediate
audience, and the enlightenment gradually spread throughout the
kingdom. Not to see the clothes would have been an admission that
one was a fool.
Legal theory-talk must pass the couturier-courtier test. There
must be at least a few other scholars who either understand the theory
or say that they do. For instance, an economic theory of law must
first pass muster with other economists of law; only then will its
acceptance pass ever more rapidly through the ranks of those who
understand less and less of it. But there is even an advantage in legal
scholarship over the Anderson fairy tale. There the courtiers at least
professed to see the "same" invisible clothes that the weavers were
displaying; no one said that the clothes were ugly.72 In the domain of
legal scholarship, one economist can take sharp issue with another
economist, disagreeing right down the line about every point in the
presentation, and yet the original theory will be reinforced, for readers
outside the courtier group will no more be able to understand the
critic than they were able to understand the original proponent.
Instead, in true academic fashion, the fact of dialogue and controversy will potently advertise the new approach, 73 speeding its acceptance. Eventually the proponent can lead a public parade with
everyone applauding (except for a little boy who has secretly read certain dirty deconstructionist books).
Judges are well served by dreary-theory, whether
or not they
understand it, because they simply pass it on in their opinions so as to
convey to the parties and to the legal community the sense of inevitability of judicial impartiality. The economic and philosophical jargon
that is beginning to characterize appellate court decisions is today's
manifestation of twelfth century Latinisms and fourteenth century
72. Actually, the story might have been improved if at least one courtier had said that he
did not like the style of the new invisible clothes, with everyone else immediately shouting him

down.
73. This repeats a point I've made in a lighter vein in D'Amato, The Ultimate Critical
Legal Studies Article: A FissiparousAnalysis, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 369, 371 (1987).
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labyrinthian forms of action.7 4 The solemn intoning of abstruse theory-lightened these days with a sprinkling of folksiness in some judicial opinions to reassure litigants that the judge is human too- serves
as an effective veneer for the fact that the decision derives its true
authoritativeness from the brute fact that the state will enforce it.
If a judge is sincerely convinced of the magical neutrality and
decision-forcing ability of economics, a lawyer has little choice but to
appeal to that judge with arguments, charts, diagrams, and partial
differentials. And those arguments might just work-for that judge.
If another judge is underwhelmed, she could nevertheless conclude
that the parties (and ultimately the legal community and the public)
will be snowed by those arguments,75 and thus she will simply employ
the jargon of theory to dress up the result she wanted to reach anyway.7 6 Hence, theory can be very powerful in adversary debate-not
for the predeconstruction reasons, but rather because it is rhetoric
that, in the immortal phrase of The Shadow, has the power to cloud
men's minds.

I predict that if the legal profession should become more committed to theory-that is, if deconstruction fizzles out-what lies in
store is ever-increasing dreary theory. The "leading" academicians
will invariably be the ones whose theories are unfathomable. Those
who can use ordinary words in convoluted sentences within even
more complex paragraphs will be favored.7 7 We will be seeing greater
use of sophisticated mathematical symbols, chemistry equations,
graphs, topological demonstrations, fractals, and other imports from
the "hard sciences" to fill up the pages of the law reviews.
X.

CONCLUSION

Threats of a less interesting legal future will not dissuade those
whose careers thrive upon the spinning of theories. But I think this
Essay has added to the deconstructionist movement a formal, specific,
and systematic demonstration that no matter how broadly or narrowly conceived, nor how simplified or aggregated, theories do not
74. Rabelais effectively satirized the situation in GARGANTUA

AND PANTAGRUEL,

bk. 3,

ch. 10 (Urquhart & Motteux trans.).
75. Wall Street pundits call this the "next sucker" theory.
76. Her downside risk is that she will encourage future advocates to discuss economics
excessively with her, causing her life as a judge to become intolerably boring.
77. Dworkin, for instance, eschews polysyllabic logorrhea, but achieves even better effect

by simple words whose meanings seem to shift as they make their way through complex
nestings of clauses, sentences, and paragraphs. See Fish, supra note 49, at 308 (1983) ("the

feeling, as one reads him, that the terms of the discussion and the levels on which it is
proceeding are continually shifting, although no shift is ever announced").
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constrain judicial results. This does not mean that theorizing is not
an interesting pursuit. (I myself have spent many fascinationg hours
... !). But in legal study, theorizing is only a way of talking about the
consistency of theories. Such theorizing takes place on a plane above
the real world; it is not connected to the real world, and does not
change anyone's decision in the real world. Theories are consistent if
they meet certain verbal tests for non-contradiction. A consistent theory may well be an intellectually satisfying achievement. But it does
not constrain the decisions judges make because it is inherently incapable of constraining those decisions.

